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This paper offers a critical re-reading of the understanding of stigma forged by the North American 
sociologist Erving Goffman in his influential Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled 
Identity (1963). One of the most widely read and cited sociologists in history, Goffman was already 
famous when Stigma was published in 1963. His previous books were best-sellers 
and Stigma alone has sold an astonishing 800,000 copies in the fifty years since its publication. 
Given its considerable influence, it is surprising how little sustained engagement there has been 
with the historicity of Goffman’s account. This paper resituates Goffman’s conceptualisation of 
stigma within the historical context of Jim Crow and the Black freedom struggles that were shaking 
“the social interaction order” to its foundations at the very moment he crafted his account. It is 
the contention of this paper that these explosive political movements against the ‘humiliations of 
racial discrimination’ invite revision of Goffman’s decidedly apolitical account of stigma (Robinson, 
2000, p. 318). This historical revision of Goffman’s stigma concept builds on an existing body of 
critical work on ‘the relationship between race, segregation and the epistemology of sociology 
within the United States’ (Bhambra, 2014). Throughout, it reads Goffman’s Stigma through the 
lens of “Black Sociology”, a field of knowledge that here designates not only formal sociological 
scholarship, but political manifestos, journalism, creative writing, oral histories and memoirs. It is 
the argument of this paper that placing Goffman’s concept of stigma into critical dialogue with 
Black epistemologies of stigma allows for a timely reconceptualisation of stigma as governmental 
technologies of de-humanisation that have long been collectively resisted from below. 
 
 







Resituating Erving Goffman: From Stigma Power to Black Power 
 
Long we’ve borne the nation’s  
Shame. 
J. Thompson ‘Exhortation’ 1933 (in Kelley, 1996, p. 103). 
 
I ask to be considered. I am not merely here and now, sealed into thingness. I am for 
somewhere else and for something else (Fanon, 2008, p. 170). 
 
Stigma: A History Lesson 
 
In January 1960, a Black teenager called Joseph McNeil travelled back from a Christmas visit with 
his family in New York, to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State Universityi in 
Greensboro. When McNeil got back to campus he described the bus journey to his friends: In 
Philadelphia, I could eat anywhere in the bus station. By Maryland, that had changed; by the time I 
arrived in Richmond, Virginia I was refused a hotdog at a food counter reserved for whites. ‘It was 
a degrading experience; three hours ago I was a human being… three hours later… some kind of 
pariah’ (Cerese & Channing, 2003). Travelling from the Northern to the Southern states in 1960 
meant crossing, in Erving’s Goffman’s terms, from one “social interaction order” into another. 
Arriving in the South in 1960 meant immersion in the spatial politics of white supremacy, manifest 
in the Jim Crow signs that segregated social spaces and in unspoken ‘customs’, rules, rituals and 
codes ‘designed to degrade and divide’ (Davis, 2004, p. 496). McNeil and three teenage friends, 
Franklin McCain, David Richmond and Jibreel Khazan,ii had spent the evenings of their first term at 
university discussing Ghandi, Langston Hughes, Martin Luther King, and Jim Crow -- a period ‘of 
institutionalized violence against African Americans’ that had lasted by then for close to a century 
(Bhambra, 2014, p. 480). They had talked long into the night about the failures of the Civil Rights 
Movement to effect meaningful change and the quotidian humiliations of living under white 
supremacy. Furious after his degrading bus journey, McNeil persuaded his friends to take direct 
action. On 1 February, the four went into the Woolworths store on South Elm Street in 
Greensboro and sat down at the “Whites only” lunch counter.iii They asked for coffee. The 
waitress refused to serve them: ‘we don’t serve Negroes here’ (Langer, 2014). The police were 
called, an officer arrived, ‘He took his knife stick out. He took his billy club and began to hit it on 
his hand’ (Cerese & Channing, 2003). Taking their place in a long history of Southern Black 
freedom fighters, the four refused to move from their seats. The Greensboro four returned to 
Woolworths lunch counter every day that week accompanied by growing numbers of students 
from A&T, Bennett College (a Black liberal arts college for women), and Dudley High School (then a 
segregated Black school). By 6 February, 1000 students were sitting-in at Greensboro Woolworths 
lunch counter. These initially minor ‘dramaturgical’ challenges to segregation escalated into the 
largest Black resistance movement in the history of the United States (Goffman, 1956).  
 
The sit-in protests garnered extensive national television news coverage. By 1958 over 80% of 
American homes had television sets, and by 1960 the use of 16mm film and the development of 
wireless audio recorders, transformed the ability of television journalists ‘to capture volatile 
demonstrations as they unfolded’ (Fleming & Morris, 2015, p. 113).iv As a consequence of this 
rapidly growing television audience, and technical advances in shooting news footage, ‘the sit-ins 
provided the nation with a unique experiment in moral theatre, where Black protestors (at times 
with white allies) nonviolently withstood verbal and physical abuse.’ (Joseph, 2014, p. 19).v Anne 
Moody, then a sociology student at Tougaloo College, described the scene at a sit-in at a 
Woolworths lunch counter in Jackson, Mississippi:   
 
the white students started chanting all kinds of anti-Negro slogans. We were called a little 
bit of everything. The rest of the seats except the three we were occupying had been 
roped off to prevent others from sitting down. A couple of the boys took one end of the 
rope and made it into a hangman’s noose. Several attempts were made to put it around 
our necks. The mob started smearing us with ketchup, mustard, sugar, pies, and 
everything on the counter. […] a Negro high school boy sat down next to me. […] the word 
“nigger” was written on his back with red spray paint (Moody, 1968, p. 238) 
 
Being Black in the United States in 1960 was to be ‘smeared with the stigma of “racial inferiority”’ 
(Haywood, 1948, p. 138). By putting their bodies in white-only spaces, these young people sought 
to dramatise ‘the studied humiliations’ of Jim Crow (Du Bois [1903], 2015, p. 160). Protesting the 
political and economic terrorism of white supremacy came at a price; people were heckled, 
intimidated, beaten, arrested and expelled from schools, colleges and jobs. As then student 
activist (and later sociology Professor) Joyce Ladner notes: ‘It was very, very difficult to continue 
because the local police and all the towns had almost crushed us. They were closing in like… They 
murdered people, they beat people’ (Ladner, Ladner & Mosnier, 2011). What motivated young 
people to participate in the face of these ‘terrible beatings, brutalities’ was often a deeply 
personal need to express the anguish of living with anti-Black racism (Kelley, 1996, p. 79). These 
‘subversive demands for a dignified life free from harassment’ (Gilroy, 2002, p. xiii) were acts of 
resistance against what Malcolm X described as the ‘psychological and physical mutilation that is 
an everyday occurrence in our lives’ (X, 1964, p. 2). As McCain reflects ‘it really started out as a 
personal thing… we didn’t like the idea of not having dignity and respect… and decided it was 
really up to us to find a solution to this thing we were suffering with’ (Boyd, 2004). McCain 
described the Woolworths protest as a reparative act: ‘almost instantaneously after sitting down 
on a simple dumb stool, I felt so relieved, I felt so clean’, ‘a feeling of total freedom’ (Cerese & 
Channing, 2003). Similarly, when Jibreel Khazan was asked what moved him to act he replied 
‘something had to be done to remove the stigma’ (Khazan, N.D., my emphasis).  
 
Introduction  
Through the examination of the history of a particularly influential sociological concept, stigma, 
this article responds to calls for a reconstruction of ‘the historical narratives that inform 
sociological conceptions of the contemporary world’ (Bhambra, 2014a, p. 1). It emerges out of an 
ongoing Leverhulme funded research project on the Sociology of Stigma (2015-2018) which seeks 
to develop new historical understandings of stigma (as) power. One of the major aims of this 
project is to supplement the often individualistic, ahistorical and politically anesthetised 
conceptualisation of stigma which dominates within the social sciences, with richer historical 
understandings of the social and political function of stigma as an instrument of social policy and 
‘component of the state’s coercive apparatus’ (Davis, 2004, p. 494). In order to better understand 
the “political economy of stigma”, I am researching the long penal history of stigma as a practice 
of social control, stretching from the penal tattooing of slaves in the Greek and Roman Empires, 
through to the badging of the poor in Industrial Britain and the stigmatisation of migrants in 
contemporary political rhetoric (Tyler, 2017; Tyler, forthcoming). This paper is guided by this 
research but the specific focus here is on the emergence of stigma as a sociological concept in the 
mid-twentieth century.vi  To this end, the paper reappraises  the understanding of stigma forged 
by the North American sociologist Erving Goffman in his influential Stigma: Notes on the 
Management of a Spoiled Identity (1963). The reason for returning to Goffman is that despite 
many subsequent refinements of his account, this short book established the conceptual 
understanding of stigma that continues to buttress contemporary sociological thinking.  
This critical reading of Goffman’s Stigma is an urgent one in the context of the wider movement to 
“decolonize” the sociological canon. Decolonising sociology necessities the development of a 
‘deep historical consciousness’ and a commitment to ‘unlearning’ the epistemological foundations 
of the discipline, in order to confront ‘more candidly the myriad of effects and consequences’ of 
the concepts, vocabularies and methods which have shaped the discourses and practices of 
sociology since its invention as a science in the mid-nineteenth century (West [1987], 2016). The 
historical revision of Goffman’s stigma concept that follows builds on a growing body of critical 
work on ‘the relationship between race, segregation and the epistemology of sociology within the 
United States’ (Bhambra, 2014, p. 472). It is not only, as Gurminder Bhambra notes, that 
‘dominant historiographies have been silent’ on the segregation of sociologists of colour and the 
sociology of racialisation and racisms from mainstream canons, but that this has had a profound 
epistemological and political impact on sociological knowledge (Bhambra, 2014a, p. 1-2). This 
paper draws particular inspiration from Roderick Ferguson’s Aberrations in Black: Towards a 
Queer of Color Critique (2004). Concerned with ‘the strategies of power that are immanent in 
canonical sociology’s will to knowledge’, Ferguson focuses on mid-twentieth century North 
American Sociology, and the ways in which ‘techniques of racial domination’ ‘are obscured 
through the language of liberal progress’ (Ferguson, 2004, p. 55, p. 63). Reading sociological 
classics alongside Black American fiction from the same period, Ferguson examines how 
sociologists produced pathological knowledge about Black culture which functioned as ‘an 
epistemological counter-part’ to official forms of state racism. Sociology, he argues, was ‘the 
supplicant of the American state’ (p. 81) employed to regulate and legislate (against) non-white 
populations. This paper brings Ferguson’s insight to bear on both the concept of stigma and 
practices of stigmatisation, by rethinking stigma as a technology of racism. 
 
One of the most widely read and cited sociologists in history, Goffman was already famous when 
Stigma was published in 1963. His previous books Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956) and 
Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (1961) were best-
selling titles, an unusual achievement for academic sociological texts. Stigma alone has sold an 
astonishing 800,000 copies in the fifty years since its publication. Given the considerable influence 
of Stigma, it is surprising how little sustained engagement there has been with the historicity of 
Goffman’s conceptualisation of stigma; Heather Love’s work on Goffman’s “stigma archive” being 
a notable exception (see Love, 2010, 2013). Reading Goffman historically isn’t an easy task for as 
Fredric Jameson notes, his work is ‘punctuated by frequent disclaimers that his material is drawn 
only from our own society and that his findings are therefore not necessarily binding on other 
social forms’; an admission which is ‘not so much an invitation to comparative research and to a 
more genuinely historical approach… as it is a dismissal of those perspectives’ (Jameson, 1976, p. 
124). Despite the difficulty of reading Goffman against the grain, this paper resituates his 
conceptualisation of stigma within the historical context of the Black freedom struggles which 
were shaking “the social interaction order” to its foundations at the moment he crafted his 
account. It is one of the central contentions of this paper that the explosive political movements 
against what Cedric Robinson termed the ‘humiliations of racial discrimination’ (Robinson, 2000, 
p. 318) in the 1960s invites revision of Goffman’s decidedly apolitical account of stigma. 
Throughout it reads Goffman’s stigma concept through the lens of Black Sociology, a field of 
knowledge which here designates not only formal sociological scholarship, but political 
manifestos, journalism, creative writing, oral histories and memoirs. It draws on the resources of 
this “Black stigma archive” to challenge Goffman’s account. In doing, this paper troubles ‘the 
conceptual matrix’ that has isolated ‘the study of race and racism’ from sociological (and social 
psychological) accounts of stigma (Magubane, 2016, p. 371). It also reveals how bringing racism to 
the front and centre of sociological understandings of stigma, transforms existing understandings 
of stigma. In particular, it is the argument of this paper that placing Goffman’s concept of stigma 
into dialogue with Black epistemologies of stigma allows for a reconceptualisation of the social 
and political function of stigma as a governmental technology of ‘racialized capitalism’ (see Bonds 
& Loyd, this issue). 
 
Struggles in the Interaction Order 
 
What distinguishes Goffman’s work is his career-long focus on social interaction defined as ‘social 
situations… in which two or more individuals are physically in one another's response presence’ 
(Goffman, 1982, p. 2). As he notes in ‘The Interaction Order’ (1982), his posthumously published 
Presidential Address to the American Sociology Association: ‘my concern over the years has been 
to promote acceptance of this face-to-face domain as an analytically viable one -- a domain whose 
preferred method of study is microanalysis’ (p. 2). The interactional spaces which Goffman was 
interested in studying extended to all conceivable public settings: ‘a local bar, a small shop floor, a 
domestic kitchen… factories, airports, hospitals, and public thoroughfares’ (p. 4). Goffman was 
interested in observing these ‘behavioural settings’ (p. 4) for what they reveal about the rules, 
norms, conventions and procedures that allow for orderly social interactions to take place. Those 
familiar with Goffman’s oeuvre will be reminded of his dramaturgical understanding of the 
interaction order as ‘a natural theater’, with a front and back stage, in which people perform 
anticipated and prescribed social roles (p. 4). He was particularly interested (and I will argue 
politically invested) in how social order is maintained, including why individuals ‘go along with 
current interaction arrangements’ even in contexts where they might ‘resent’ or ‘resist’ the costs 
of social arrangements (p. 5). Goffman’s concern with ‘shared cognitive presuppositions’ and ‘self-
sustained restraints’ that underpin human interactions inevitably raises questions about what 
kinds of structures and values shape the interactions that comprise social worlds (p. 4). As 
Goffman states, ‘questions do arise when we consider the fact that there are categories of 
persons – in our own society very broad ones – whose members constantly pay a very 
considerable price for their interactional existence’ (p. 6). However, while Goffman acknowledges 
these questions, he refuses to dwell on them. Rather, he argues that the work of the micro-analyst 
necessitates a “bracketing off” of the economic and political imperatives that structure 
behavioural settings. One of the ‘warrants’ he offers for this elision is that his approach is not 
‘informed by a concern over the plight of disadvantaged groups’ (p. 2). What is striking about this 
statement is that Goffman’s career as a sociologist spanned some of the most tumultuous decades 
of resistance by ‘disadvantaged groups’ –  including Black people, women, disabled people, ‘mad’ 
people and queers – to the dominant social order in US history. More than this, the grassroots 
resistance movements which characterised this period were taking place within the very 
‘behavioral settings’, and involved conflicts in exactly the kinds of ‘service transactions’, which 
were, ostensibly, at the very centre of Goffman’s sociological interest (p. 2, p. 7). As Stokely 
Carmichael put it in 1966 ‘I am black. I know that. I also know that while I am black I am a human 
being, and therefore I have the right to go into any public place’ (Carmichael, 1966, my 
emphasis).vii 
 
Two months after Greensboro electrified the Civil Rights Movement from below, the formation of 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) saw young people’s actions against racial 
segregation extended to “Freedom Rides” which challenged segregation on interstate travel, 
kneel-ins at segregated churches, sleep-ins at segregated motels, swim-ins at segregated pools, 
wade-ins at segregated beaches, read-ins at segregated libraries, play-ins at segregated parks, 
watch-ins at segregated cinemas and theatres, wait-ins at housing developments, chain-ins at city 
halls and participation in rent-strikes (Boggs, 2011).viii By the spring of 1960 it was estimated that 
fifty thousand people had participated in “interactional” forms of political resistance against the 
violent regimes of racial stigma which characterised Jim Crow. By 1963 ‘the southern struggle had 
grown from a modest group of Black students demonstrating at one lunch-counter to the largest 
mass movement for racial reform and civil rights in the 20th century’ (Younge, 2013). It was in the 
midst of these political struggles in “the interaction order” that Goffman crafted his concept of 
stigma. 
 
Between 1960-1963 Goffman was teaching a course called ‘Deviance and Social Control’ at the 
University of Berkley, and Stigma emerged out of his lectures for his course. While teaching at 
Berkley Goffman would have been acutely aware of the Black freedom struggles which were 
exploding all around in ‘sit-ins, marches, protest rallies and urban upheavals’ (Collins, 2007, p. 
585).ix As indicated above, newspaper images and television footage of ‘chanting demonstrators 
being sprayed by fire hoses and attacked by dogs, freedom riders being abused, sit-in participants 
being taunted or beaten, and small Black children requiring military escorts to enter public 
schools’ made for powerful viewing in this period (Macdonald in Robinson, 1997, p. 145). 
Moreover, as a consequence of the sit-in movement, the ‘pernicious de facto segregation of the 
Urban North’ was increasingly seen through the lens of the ‘codified racial discrimination’ of Jim 
Crow (Taylor, 2016, p. 37).  From the spring of 1960, Berkeley students were picketing hotels and 
shops which were known to practice racial discrimination in their employment practices in 
solidarity with southern sit-in movements (Freeman, 2004). We know that this anti-racist politics 
leaked into Goffman’s classroom, as the sociologist Gary Marx, then a student in Goffman’s 1961 
‘Deviance and Social Control’ class, recalls: 
At the end of the last class session a black student said "this is all very interesting 
Professor Goffman, but what's the use of it for changing the conditions you describe?" 
Goffman was visibly shaken. He stood up, slammed shut the book he had open on the 
desk and said "I'm not in that business" and stormed out of the room (Marx, 1984). 
  
In what follows, I examine what happens to Goffman’s account of stigma when we take seriously 
the question of this unnamed Black studentx: ‘what's the use of it for changing the conditions you 
describe?’ 
 
Social Relations without Power Relations 
 
In the opening pages of Stigma, Goffman offers a working definition of stigma as, ‘an attribute 
that is deeply discrediting’ (1986, p. 2) and ‘the situation of the individual who is disqualified from 
full social acceptance’ (Preface). However, what is most novel and influential about the definition 
of stigma he proposes, is the ways in which Goffman roots stigma in his existing understanding of 
social identities as ‘perspectives’ produced in interactional settings (p. 138).  While stigma might 
be experienced as emanating from the body of the stigmatised, in fact stigma describes a relation 
between normal and stigmatised persons. What he means by this is that people acquire stigma in 
their exchanges with other people – be this a look, a glance, a comment or a more overt form of 
discrimination such as name-calling. Goffman’s understanding of stigma, as something produced 
in social settings, pivots on the existence of a social consensus about “what is normal”. For 
Goffman, society “works” and “coheres” to the extent that members of society implicitly 
understand and share, or at least accept, the norms in operation in a given social context. So, in 
social interactions, Goffman argues, ‘there is some expectation on all sides that those in a given 
category should not only support a particular norm but also realize it’ (p. 6). Stigma describes a 
particular kind of negative social relation then, as it arises when an individual fails to realise ‘a 
particular norm’ (ibid.). Further, stigma not only describes a relation between people, but also a 
relation of self to self.  Goffman argues that it is through processes of socialisation that an 
individual ‘learns and incorporates the stand-point of the normal’ and in doing understands how 
they are likely to be placed in a stratified order of normal-stigma positionalities (p. 32). Through 
this psycho-social process, people judge themselves against incorporated norms and anticipate 
‘the standards against which they fall short’ (p. 32). In short, rather like Pierre Bourdieu’s 
relational theory of social class, for Goffman social identities are not properties of a person, but 
emerge in encounters between social actors and in doing become incorporated as part of oneself. 
However, unlike Bourdieu, his account of stigma as a relational classification excludes questions of 
how social relations are structured through power. 
 
Where do these norms come from? Again, Goffman anticipates but doesn’t this answer this 
question, stating on the first page of his book: ‘Society establishes the means of categorizing 
persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of these 
categories’ (p. 2). Towards the end of Stigma, he admits that stigmatisation is historically specific 
in the forms it takes (p. 138), notes that ‘shifts have occurred in the kinds of disgrace that arouse 
concern’, and implicitly acknowledges that stigma functions ‘as a means of formal social control’ 
(p. 139).  However, he expresses little curiosity about where norms come from, what they 
prescribe, what the effects of these prescriptions might be, or how they might be challenged or 
transformed. Rather, he is concerned with detailing the more abstract operations of the system 
within which face-to-face interactions take place, in smooth or disordered ways. That is, his 
interest is in how social rules work rather than in what they proscribe. So while a relational 
understanding of stigma is at the core of Goffman’s account, his understanding of normal-stigma 
relations is divorced from power relations—both the macro-level structural power relations of, for 
example, Capitalism or Patriarchy, or the power inflected micro-aggressions of everyday 
interactions. Fredric Jameson suggests that this suspension of questions of power is deliberate, for 
Goffman’s ambition is ‘to evolve abstractions which hold for all social situations’, rather than to 
develop an understanding which is ‘concrete and historically determinate’ (Jameson, 1976, p. 
129).  It is possible to read power back into Goffman, and indeed this is what many sociologists 
who draw on his stigma concept have subsequently done, by thinking about stigma as a form of 
oppression or discrimination. However, it is the contention of this paper that thinking with this 
absence of power in Goffman remains important for understanding some of the remaining 
limitations of stigma as a conceptual tool for sociology. Employing Greensboro and the challenging 
question of Goffman’s student as I guide, I want to consider what ‘this ambition to evolve’ an 
abstract understanding of stigma which might ‘hold for all social situations’ implies in terms of 
Goffman’s methodology (Jameson, 1976, p. 129). I ask what it means to argue that society informs 
stigma categorisations in advance of interactional encounters without reference to, for example, 
colonial histories of power. And I want to reflect on how the structural absence of questions of 
power has shaped subsequent understandings of what stigma is, what stigma does and what 
stigma is for.  
 
Atrocity Tales: Goffman’s Methods 
Despite his career-long concern with social interaction, Stigma is not grounded, as are some of 
Goffman’s earlier studies such as Asylums (1961), or his PhD research in a Shetland Islands 
community which formed the basis of The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956), in original 
ethnographic research. Indeed, despite being recognised as ‘one of the founding figures of 
microsociology’, and despite his self-presentation as pioneer of observational methods, his ‘links 
to both ethnography and empiricism are rather tenuous, since he rarely engaged in traditional 
fieldwork and drew on both fictional literary texts and fabricated anecdotes for his evidence’ 
(Love, 2013, p. 419). Goffman states that his objective in Stigma is to explore what a burgeoning 
psychological literature on stigma – but ‘especially popular work’ –  might ‘yield for sociology’ 
(Preface). As Love details, it transpires from his footnotes that what Goffman means by ‘popular 
work’ is memoirs and biographies, letters and newspaper articles, ‘lightly fictionalized [medical] 
case histories, human interest stories, and counterfactuals’ (Love, 2013, p. 420). Indeed, Stigma 
opens with an epigraph, a fictional letter written by a 16-year-old girl who was ‘born without a 
nose’ to a newspaper ‘agony aunt’, which Goffman has taken from Nathaniel West’s bleak comic 
depression-era novel Miss Lonelyhearts (1933). Goffman’s use of this fictional epigraph has been 
interpreted as signalling compassion (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault, 2016, p. 176). However, given 
West’s ‘ironic’ and ‘dispassionate’ treatment of ‘emotionally and politically charged material’ in 
this novel, it seems more likely that Goffman is making a playful statement about his own cool and 
detached approach to stigma (Love, 2013, p. 423). Indeed, I would argue that his use of this 
epigraph is best understood as a dry joke: the punchline being, as Goffman will argue at the end of 
Stigma, that ‘we normals’ might, just like the antihero in West’s novel, find ourselves switched 
into the role of the stigmatised (Goffman, 1986, p. 5).  
Stigma draws together a heterogeneous and eclectic archive of writing about blindness, facial 
deformities, cripples, amputees, alcoholics, gentleman criminals, ex-cons, prostitutes, 
homosexuals, the “mentally deficient”, “the mad”, anti-Semitism and anti-Black racism. Goffman 
describes his reading method as ‘an exercise’ in ‘marking off the material on stigma from 
neighboring facts’ and ‘showing how this material can be economically described within a singular 
conceptual schema’ (Preface). Love argues that this ‘marking off’ of ‘facts’ necessitates what she 
describes (approvingly) as ‘thin description’ (Love, 2013).xi What this method amounts to in 
practice is that there is often no discernible difference in how Goffman deploys, for example, an 
extract from a clinical account of a facial disfigurement, or a personal memoir or fictional account 
on the same topic. Certainly, he rarely introduces the authors of the materials he quotes from in 
his text, but rather substitutes particular accounts of stigma in his text with abstract “stigma 
figures”, such as ‘a blind writer’, ‘a multipole sclerotic’, ‘a cripple’, ‘a prostitute’, ‘a homosexual’, ‘a 
Negro’, ‘a Jew’ (Goffman, 1986). This abstraction produces the ‘stylistic effect, of impartial 
"realism"’ (Schweik, 2014). It is telling in this regard that Stigma is sometimes misread as based on 
Goffman’s own first-hand observational research. What I want to draw attention to here is the 
politics of a method which deliberately eschews contextual information in this way. 
 
What is veiled through this method of abstraction are the particular genres and aesthetics of the 
writing he draws upon, and the multiple perspectives encoded within these texts. Most 
significantly, in suppressing ‘neighboring facts’ Goffman erases the original intentions which might 
have motivated what is often confessional writing about stigma (Goffman, 1986, Preface). As 
noted, this suppression of authorial intention is deliberate on Goffman’s part, for as he explains 
his account of stigma is not written for ‘them’, and it is not ‘informed by a concern over the plight 
of disadvantaged groups’ (1986?, p. 2). This point is underlined by his acerbic characterisation of 
some of the literature he draws upon as ‘atrocity tales’ written by ‘stigma professionals’ and 
‘heroes of adjustment’ who seek to ‘present the case for the stigmatized’ (1986, p. 25). In short, 
Stigma draws on the writing of people who understood themselves in various ways as stigmatised 
(or are concerned about the fates of stigmatised people) but it fails to engage with the authors of 
this stigma data as ‘knowers’ or understand these confessional literatures as knowledge. On the 
contrary, Goffman’s method of abstraction proceeds from what Kristie Dotson has described as 
‘an active practice of unknowing’ (2011, p. 243). 
 
It is important to note at this juncture that Stigma was written during a resurgence in confessional 
writing in US and wider European culture. Indeed, this “confessional turn” was central to social 
and political struggles of the period, beginning with the Civil Rights Movement and extending to 
feminist, queer, disability and anti-psychiatry movements (Goffman’s Asylums played a central 
role in the later). Goffman acknowledges the ‘current literary fashion’ for confessional writing, 
self-help literature and ‘advice to the stigmatized’ in which ‘deeply hidden sores are touched upon 
and examined’ (1986, p. 112).  He dismissively cites James Baldwin in a footnote as an example of 
‘material of this kind in regard to Negroes’ (fn. 18, p. 112). At the same time, he veils over any of 
the reformist, consciousness-raising and/or political intentions of these ‘atrocity tales’ (p. 25). 
More than this, by transforming the authors of these stigma experiences into abstract figures -- 
such as “negroes” in the aforementioned footnote about Baldwin -- Goffman enacts a ‘testimonial 
quieting’ (Dotson, 2011, p. 242) which mimics the dehumanising effects that the concept of 
stigmatisation describes. Goffman’s reproduction of stigma in his writing, illustrates how stigma is 
a relation characterised by the relative power of “the normal” to silence, constrain and 
misrepresent “the other”. The argument I am signalling here, is that reconceptualising stigma as a 
political economy of (de)valuation requires critical methods which are rooted not in the imagined 
“neutral” observational methods of the sociologist, but in peoples’ struggles against the social 
structures that produce them as ‘markedly inferior’ (Du Bois, 1916, p. 86). 
 
The Stigma of Disability 
 
While this paper focuses on racial stigma, or more precisely stigma as another name for racism, I 
want to note at this juncture the understanding of stigma developed by disabled people in the 
early 1960s. In particular, I want to draw attention to the groundbreaking collection, Stigma: The 
Experience of Disability (1966), a series of autobiographical essays written by physically disabled 
people and edited by activist and writer Paul Hunt. What Hunt develops, through the curation and 
editing of this extraordinary collection of essays, is a multi-perspectival account of stigma from 
below. Indeed, in his contribution to this collection, ‘A Critical Condition’, Hunt argues, in a thinly 
veiled critique of Goffman, that stigma should not be theorised from the perspective of “normals” 
but from ‘the uncomfortable, subversive position from which we act as a living reproach to any 
scale of values that puts attributes or possessions before the person’ (Hunt, 1966, p. 159). In this 
essay, Hunt develops an understanding of stigma as a technology of disablement which stratifies 
people along a differential axis of in/humanity. Hunt’s concept of stigma emerged from his 
concern with the ways in which stigma legitimated the segregation of disabled people from 
mainstream society. It is stigma, he argues, which allows disabled people to be perceived as 
‘unfortunate’, ‘useless’, ‘tragic’ and ‘abnormal’ and thus undeserving of the rights or 
considerations of ‘normal’ able-bodied citizens (Hunt, 1966). Indeed, Hunt composed Stigma 
(1966) in a residential home in England where he was incarcerated against his will.xii  
 
All my adult life has been spent in institutions amongst people who, like myself, have 
severe and often progressive physical disabilities. We are paralysed and deformed, most 
of us in wheelchairs, either as the result of accident or of diseases like rheumatoid 
arthritis, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, cerebral palsy and polio (Hunt, 1966, p. 
145).  
Hunt’s understanding of stigma as a political economy emerges from the longer penal history of 
stigma (Tyler 2017: Tyler, forthcoming), as a cruel system of classification which marks out 
categories of people in order to impede their freedom and mobility. Further, his understanding of 
the relationship between stigma and segregation – for his was an anti-segregationist disability 
politics -- was directly inspired by the US Civil Rights Movement.  While, as Hunt notes, the 
‘injustice and brutality suffered by so many because of racial tension makes our troubles as 
disabled people look very small’, the dehumanisation of disabled people ‘stirs in me a little of the 
same anger’ which ‘James Baldwin reveals in The Fire Next Time’: a rather different reading of 
Baldwin and his centrality to freedom struggles against stigma than that suggested by Goffman 
(Hunt, 1966, p. 153). As Hunt concludes, stigma is a vital terrain of political struggle and ‘we who 
are disabled are deeply affected by the assumptions of our uselessness that surround us. But it is 
vital that we should not accept this devaluation of ourselves’ (Hunt, 1966, p. 149). While I cannot 
do justice to Hunt’s pivotal contribution to disability activism and scholarship here, it is important 
to note the foundational role his conceptualisation of stigma as a pivotal force in the social 
segregation of disabled people played in the development of the social model of disability, and the 
policy and attitudinal changes which followed. Sadly, it is Goffman’s, and not Hunt’s, Stigma which 
is the most cited text in disability studies today.xiii   
Professor Normal 
 
 The problems I have identified with Goffman’s methods, his suppression of questions of power, 
and his silencing of the perspectives of the “stigma knowers” he draws upon, are embedded 
within the very structure of his stigma concept. To further illustrate this, I want to briefly return to 
the status of norms in Stigma.  As feminist, queer and critical race theorists have elaborated,xiv it is 
often by unpacking norms that we get to the crux of the problem, the problem here being how 
Goffman’s “neutral” sociological account of stigma in 1963 reproduces what Du Bois described as 
the ‘National Stigma’ of racism (Du Bois, 1916, p. 86). 
 
Goffman uses the terms “norms”, “normal” and those he designates as ‘we normals’ in multiple 
ways (1986, p. 5).  At some points in Stigma norms seem to designate ideals ‘and standards’; at 
others norms refer to foundational social rules which precede all social interactions; and at others 
norms are imagined as more akin to perceptual frames – the social optics - through which we 
perceive others (p. 128). In all these cases, norms describe accepted rules, conventions and ways 
of seeing. Indeed, Goffman is emphatic that ‘a necessary condition for social life is the sharing of a 
single set of normative expectations by all participants’ (p. 127-8, my emphasis). The normal 
human being is also used to mark the authorial position of Goffman, the ‘neutral’ sociological 
observer, in the text, while the address ‘we normals’ is employed several times in Stigma as a 
proxy for the imagined readers of his book. What “we’ -- his readers – are invited to imagine we 
have in common with the authorial ‘I’, is a shared normality. In short, while Goffman argues that 
stigma is relational, his stigma concept is crafted from the authorial position of ‘the normal human 
being’, the powerful positionality of one who attributes stigma to those imagined as failing pre-
agreed social norms of appearance or behaviour. So while, as noted above, his account of stigma 
draws on the experiential knowledge of stigmatised people, Goffman mediates this stigma 
knowledge through the perspective of ‘we normals’ (p. 5). As he writes, ‘norms regarding social 
identity pertain to the kinds of role repertoires or profiles we feel it permissible for any given 
individual to sustain’ (p. 81 my emphasis). Goffman justifies grounding his definition of stigma in 
‘the notion of the “normal human being”’ by arguing firstly, that this is ‘the basic imaginary’ 
through which ‘laymen currently conceive of themselves’ (fn. 10, p. 7), and secondly, that we live 
in rational societies characterised by ‘the tendency of large-scale bureaucratic organizations, such 
as the nation state, to treat all members in some respects as equal’ (fn. 10, p. 7). Yet as he wrote 
this justification, millions of American citizens were explicitly contesting “the facts” of this 
equality, and “the forms” which ‘a normal human being’ could take (ibid.). As we have established 
Goffman was aware of ongoing social and political challenges to white normativity and racial 
stigma but refused to dwell on the political economy of stigma, noting that his ‘is a statement 
about the social function of these processes and not about their cause or desirability’ (pp. 129-
130). 
 
Unsurprisingly, and perhaps accurately in the context of the United States in the early 1960s, 
Goffman reveals that the singular norm he is writing about (and from the perspective of) is ‘that of 
the young, married, white, urban, northern’ male (p. 128). ‘There is only one complete unblushing 
male in America’ he argues, and ‘[e]very American male tends to look out upon the world’ from 
the perspective of heterosexual able-bodied white masculinity (p. 128). Goffman describes this 
white male norm as the ‘general identity-values’ of American society adding that this ideal identity 
casts a ‘shadow on the encounters encountered everywhere in daily living’ (p. 129). Goffman 
doesn’t reveal the figure of “heterosexual able-bodied white masculinity” as the measure of 
‘general identity-values’ until the reader is reaching the final chapters of Stigma. However, once 
the abstract normal collapses into the particularity of this figure, he grants us a key with which to 
unravel “the normal perspective” through and from which he produced his account of stigma. 
Given the strictures of this ideal human, people’s potential to fail this norm, and be stigmatised as 
a consequence, is extensive. Goffman’s cast of “stigma figures” includes the physically disabled, 
people with ‘blemishes of individual character’ such as ‘weak will, domineering or unnatural 
passions, treacherous, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, 
unemployment, suicidal attempts’ extending to ‘radical political behavior’ and those tainted by 
what he terms ‘tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion’ (1986, p. 4). Perhaps Goffman was 
reflecting on his own Jewish ethnicity, but it seems more likely he was reflecting on the stigma of 
being Black in the United States, when he added that ‘tribal stigma’ ‘can be transmitted through 
lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family’ (1986, p. 4).xv   
 
Goffman’s figures for racial stigma include the ‘educated northern Negro’ (p. 44) who finds 
themselves mistaken for a Southern Negro, ‘urban lower class Negroes’ (p. 44), ‘an apprehended 
Negro’ (fn. 1 p. 46), ‘black-skinned Negroes who have never passed publicly’ (p. 74), and ‘a passing 
Negro and the white girl he wants to marry’ (fn. 101 p. 95). Goffman also comments on how skin-
lightening products are fraudulently sold as a remedy for the stigma of dark skin (p. 9), and 
reflects on the ambivalent social position of ‘the light-skinned Negro’ who ‘can never be sure what 
the attitude of a new acquaintance will be’ (p. 14). While Goffman suggests that many stigmas can 
be successfully concealed or managed, he reflects on the fact that visibly racialised minorities and 
members of the lower class ‘who quite noticeably bear the mark of their status in their speech, 
appearance, and manner, and who, relative to the public institutions of our society find they are 
second class citizens’ are ‘all likely on occasion to find themselves functioning as stigmatized 
individuals’ (p. 146). For sure, the version of white normativity which Goffman depicts in Stigma 
tallies with accounts such as W.E.B. Du Bois’, who had argued two decades earlier in Dusk of 
Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept that being Black in America is to be 
‘badged’ by colour, to be marked out ‘for discrimination and insult’ (Du Bois, 2007, p. 59, p. 126). 
However, what Black Sociology also tells us is that living as a person racialised as Black in the early 
1960s didn’t mean being stigmatised, ‘on occasion’, it meant daily confrontation ‘with the realities 
of racism, not simply as individual acts dictated by attitudinal bias’ but with an entire society 
organised through ‘racial terrorism’ (Davis, 2004, p. 496). Further, unlike his Black sociological 
elders and contemporaries, Goffman offers no account of why ‘to be unconditionally “American” 
is to be white, and to be black is a misfortune’, or how historical norms of white supremacy were 
being challenged as he wrote his book (Killian & Grigg [1964] in Carmichael & Hamilton, 1992, p. 
31). Moreover, we reach a major contradiction in Goffman’s account of racial stigma, when he 
suggests that there is a natural difference between what he terms the ‘congenital’ sign of skin 
colour and imposed social signs such as ‘a brand mark or maiming’ (1986, p. 46). Goffman is here 
not only illustrating existing racism in US society but also normalising racial difference as a “fact” 
which is consequent of deeper genetic human difference. Indeed, his argument that the 
‘congenital’ “fact of blackness” is ‘a permanent part of the person’ (p. 46), seems to trouble 
Goffman’s own conclusion in Stigma that ‘the normal’ and ‘the stigmatized’ are social roles -- and 
that anybody might find themselves in either role in a given (interactional) context (p. 46). For 
Goffman, blackness is a stigma which is it impossible to erase. A ‘stigma of inferiority that resides 
not merely in the label or designation of race’, but is imagined as ‘embodied in black presence’ 
(Williams, 1990, pp. 542-543). In this sense, the figure of the normal human in Stigma doesn’t only 
describe existing social norms but reproduces what Lewis Gordon describes as ‘the in-advance 
claim of the white world to human status’ (Gordon, 2006, p. 255).xvi Indeed if, as Goffman argues, 
‘we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human’ (p. 5), then Black readers of Stigma find 
both that they are ‘not structurally regarded as human beings’ and that this dehumanised 
positionality is their permanent fate (Gordon, 2015, p. 22).  
 
For many sociologists, what is appealing about Goffman’s conceptualisation of stigma is precisely 
that it is relational, contextual, contingent and historically malleable. However, by taking Goffman 
“at his word”, I have demonstrated that one of the limitations of his account is that he uses norms 
to obfuscate and naturalise existing arrangements of power. Goffman argues that ‘we believe the 
person with a stigma is not quite human’ and ‘on this assumption we exercise varieties of 
discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances’ 
(Goffman, 1986, p. 5).  He also stresses that the ‘psychological price’ of stigmatisation is ‘living a 
life that can be collapsed at any moment’ (1986, p. 108). However, he offers neither compassion 
nor space for imagining alternatives to the system of confining and discriminating norms he 
describes. Rather, he argues that normal and stigmatised people should ‘accept’ social norms: 
‘Not doing so, one could hardly get on with the business at hand; one could hardly have any 
business at hand’ (1986?, p. 5).  That this is a political recommendation is most evident in one of 
the final sections of Stigma, when Goffman makes a series of proposals about how individuals 
might manage living with stigma. This is one of the few places in the book that Goffman addresses 
the stigmatised rather than ‘we normals’. His proposals to those suffering with stigma are 
conservative, pragmatic and—given the relational character of his theory of stigma -- oddly 
individualistic.  
 
‘Normals’, Goffman reassures the stigmatised, ‘really mean no harm’, and ‘should therefore be 
tactfully helped to act nicely’ (p. 116). He argues that the stigmatised should not contest the 
norms that produce stigma, but instead develop strategies of stigma management in social 
settings where stigma might arise. Goffman’s proposals for the stigmatised include ‘information 
management’ (1986, p. 135) ‘the arts of impression management’ (p. 130), employing strategies 
of ‘passing and covering’ (p. 130), adopting a position of ‘tolerance’ (p. 121) and refraining ‘from 
pushing claims for acceptance much past the point normals find comfortable’ (p. 130). As he 
writes, ‘When the stigmatized person finds that normals have difficulty in ignoring his failing, he 
should try to help them and the social situation by conscious efforts to reduce tension’ (p. 116). In 
the context of Goffman’s larger oeuvre, we might understand these proposals on the 
management of stigma as dramaturgical—in the sense that they offer suggestions to the 
stigmatised about how to play an assigned social role which minimises the discomfort of 
‘normals’, and in doing support, rather than challenge, the existing relations of power inscribed in 
social norms. Further, while Goffman cautions that the stigmatised should not ‘ingratiatingly act 
out before normals the full dance of bad qualities imputed to his kind’ (p. 110), he also advises 
they should play the parts society has assigned to them. To this end he quotes the Norwegian 
writer Finn Carling who, reflecting on his own experience of living with cerebral palsy, notes: 
the cripple has to play the part of the cripple, just as many women have to be what the 
men expect them to be, just women; and the Negroes often have to act like clowns in 
front of the `superior' white race, so that the white man shall not be frightened by his 
black brother (in Goffman, 1986, p. 110).  
What we learn from Goffman is that for people racialised as Black, “managing a spoiled identity” 
means interacting in public in ways which protects white people from ‘the ferocious mythology of 
blackness…  as the embodiment of inferiority’ (Williams, 1990, p. 543).  In order to decolonise 
Goffman’s stigma concept, it is imperative that we question why he is so seemingly invested in 
maintaining an arrangement of normal-stigma relations in which only people who are socially 
marked as white can be normal. We also have to question why Goffman remained so empathically 
silent about the struggles against anti-Black racism -- struggles which precisely sought to challenge 
white normativity by disrupting racist norms of social interaction — while they were unfolding all 
around him – including in his own classroom. 
 
‘A Black Boy Hacked into a Murderous Lesson’  
 
Reading Stigma through the lens of Black freedom struggles it is possible to discern ‘the strategies 
of power that are immanent’ within Goffman’s stigma theory (Ferguson, 2004, p. 55). In effect, by 
arguing for the management of stigma, that is for its pacification, Goffman normalises stigma and 
conceals ‘its violent underpinning and periodic atrocities’ (Steinberg, 2007, p. 42). From this 
perspective, Goffman’s stigma concept ‘is not innocent of politics, but on the contrary, provides 
epistemic authority’ for the suppression of Black humanity (ibid.).   
 
To take just one example, the Greensboro Four and many others amongst the Black students who 
would follow them in staging sit-in protests across the segregated Southern states, were haunted 
by the lynching of 14-year-old Emmett Till in Mississippi in 1955—indeed Joyce Ladner coined this 
generation of civil rights activists ‘the Emmett Till generation’ (Ladner, Ladner & Mosnier, 2011).  
Born and raised in Chicago, Till was visiting relatives in the small town of Money, when he 
allegedly wolf whistled at a white womanxvii in a Grocery store. Seemingly unaware of ‘the 
subtleties of the Jim Crow Mississippi code of racial etiquette’ (Rubin, 1995, p. 45), for this crime 
of alleged flirtation he was abducted, tortured, maimed and shot. His mutilated body was later 
recovered from the Tallahatchie River. Till’s mother insisted her son’s corpse be displayed in an 
open coffin in order, in her words, to ‘rip the sheets off the state of Mississippi’ (Mobley & 
Benson, 2004, p. 151). However, the terrible violent truth exposed by the circulation of 
photographs of Till’s disfigured body, and the later acquittal of his killers by an all-white jury, left 
many Black teenagers fearful, angry and despairing. For this generation of young Black citizens, 
images of Till’s body functioned as both an image of injustice and, as Audre Lorde put it, as a 
‘veiled warning’-- a ‘black boy hacked into a murderous lesson’ (Lorde, 2002, p. 340).  
 
The death of Till, the publicity surrounding his death and the acquittal of his killers, reveals how 
whiteness as a ‘general identity-value’ cast its long shadow over Black lives in the 1960s (Goffman, 
1986 p. 129). Franklin McCain described Till’s death as a revelation which left his 15-year-old self 
in a suicidal depression: ‘there seemed no prospect for dignity or respect as a young black man’ 
(Younge, 1999, p. 108). This was a context where Black people daily negotiated interactional 
settings where not playing your socially assigned role as a racially stigmatised person, failing to 
appropriately manage your racial stigma by reducing tensions in your interactions with white 
people, could led to your death. As Khazan recalled, this murder revealed ‘what happened if we 
broke the code. If we spoke out of turn, we too could die like Emmett Till’ (Cerese & Channing, 
2003). The haunting of this generation by the lynching of Emmett Till illustrates how stigma power 
works to confine and segregate, to keep people ‘down and away’ (Link & Phelan 2014, p. 26). 
However, it also reveals how the violence of being stigmatised can become politicised and act as a 
catalyst for social change. Joyce Ladner describes, as a teenager, keeping a scrapbook of cuttings 
about Emmett Till which she would regularly weep over in her bedroom. As she states ‘That was 
the image for our generation that galvanised our generation, we all saw that image on the front 
cover of Jet magazine… Every black southerner for sure had seen that photograph and it was like 
the clarion call for action… when we got older we were going to avenge his death’ (Ladner, Ladner 
& Mosnier, 2011). Ladner would later bring this activism to bear on the discipline of sociology 
itself, laying bare, in her edited volume The Death of White Sociology (1973), the white norms and 
racial-bias at the heart of the discipline. 
 
Stigma as Struggle 
 
Resituating Goffman’s stigma concept within the context of Black freedom struggles against ‘the 
legal stigma of second class citizenship’ has revealed how his understanding of stigma proceeds 
from what was then, as now, a deeply contested understanding of white prototypicality and Black 
inhumanity (Marable, 2000 p. 106). While Goffman’s stigma concept uncouples the perception of 
Black skin as a stigma from the history of racism—and specifically in the US the history of slavery, 
Black freedom struggles remind us that racial stigmatisation is a historical practice ‘centuries in 
the making’ (Spillers, 2003, p. 21). A regime of seeing, a ‘stigma-optics’, which was crafted in order 
to deny Black people personhood (Tyler, forthcoming). As Carmichael put it in his ‘Black Power’ 
speech to students at Berkeley in October 1966, ‘we are now engaged in a psychological struggle 
in this country… The question is, ‘How can white society begin to move to see black people as 
human beings?’ (Carmichael, 1966). 
 
What is of interest--- both sociologically and politically ---is not only how stigma is lived and 
managed but how it is refused, reworked and resisted by those whom it abjects (Tyler, 2013). 
While Black (and disabled) readers of Goffman’s Stigma find themselves not structurally regarded 
as human beings in this text, we also know that in 1963 many millions of Black American citizens 
sought ‘to win recognition as human outside of the restrictive terms set by the racial order’ 
(Gilroy, 2014, p. 7). By targeting the interaction order, their struggles made visible the concrete 
ways in which white supremacy invaded ‘the lives of Black people on an infinite variety of levels’ 
(Davis 2004, p. 496). As James Boggs noted this was unlike the preceding Civil Rights Movement of 
the 1950s in that ‘it aimed at creating the issue, provoking it’ (Boggs, 2011, p. 135). What Black 
activists realised is that in order to challenge ‘the stigmata of degradation’ they needed to 
remediate racial stigma (Du Bois, 1933, p. 199). Breaking the social rules around segregation, 
these Black activists provoked violent forms of stigmatisation. In doing, they crafted new 
perceptual frames for understanding the operations of racial discrimination. Reflecting on what 
motivated him to join the sit-in movement as a teenager in 1960, Stokley Carmichael recalls how: 
‘when I saw those kids on TV, getting back up on the lunch counter stools after being knocked off 
them, sugar in their eyes, catsup in their hair—well, something happened to me. Suddenly I was 
burning’ (Park, 1967, p. 80). As Abdelmalek Sayad notes: 
Black American sociology and colonial sociology teach that, as a general rule, one form of 
revolt, and undoubtedly the primary form of revolt against stigmatization […] consists in 
reclaiming the stigma, which then becomes an emblem of [resistance]. (Sayad, 2006, p. 173, 
my translation). 
 
Through acts of stigma dramaturgy, the Civil Rights Movement publicised, revolted against and 
reversed the power of stigma.  
 
Conclusion: Stigma After Goffman 
 
In 1963, the year Stigma was published, the pioneering Black sociologist and activist W.E.B Du Bois 
died in exile in Accra, Ghana – the U.S. government had confiscated his passport. After Du Bois’ 
death, ‘Maya Angelou led a group of Americans and Ghanaians to the U.S. embassy in Accra, 
carrying torches and placards reading “Down with American Apartheid” and “America, a White 
Man's Heaven and a Black Man's Hell”’ (Euchner, 2010). A day later, at the March on Washington, 
Roy Wilkins, leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
led a minutes silence in remembrance of Du Bois. As he stated to the hundreds of thousands of 
marchers ‘his was the voice that was calling to you to gather here today in this cause. If you want 
to read something that applies to 1963 go back and get a volume of The Souls of Black Folk by Du 
Bois, published in 1903’ (Euchner, 2010).xviii While Goffman didn’t reference him, Du Bois was the 
first theorist of stigma power, identifying not only ‘the problem of the Twentieth Century as the 
problem of the colour-line’, but detailing how this line was enforced, reproduced and legitimated 
by the ‘systematic humiliation’ of Black lives (Du Bois, 2015, p. 1, p. 8). 
 
There is a growing recognition that ‘racism and intellectual segregation’ have not only limited and 
divided the sociological tradition, but continue to diminish the capacity of the discipline ‘to 
comprehend the key problems of the twenty-first century’ (Back & Tate, 2015). When Goffman 
was teaching at Berkeley this segregation was challenged by Black students, as it is today in the 
transnational “Why is My Curriculum White?” movement. In the spring of 1961 a group of 
Berkeley students formed a reading group, the Afro-American Association, which crafted an 
alternative “Black Curriculum” featuring the work of scholars such as Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, James 
Baldwin, E Franklin Frazier and Kwame Nkrumah (Kelley, 2016). This group soon extended their 
activities into the wider community, running a weekly radio programme that attracted other Bay 
area college and university students, including Huey Newton and Bobby Seale who went on to 
form the Black Panthers. At the same time, in segregated Black universities in the Southern states, 
such as Tougaloo College in Mississippi, Black sociology students like Anne Moody, Joyce Ladner 
and their professors became active participants in the sit-in movements. Indeed, Jibrel Khazan of 
the Greensboro Four was also a sociology major. Together these students, activists and scholars 
were busy producing sociological knowledge about stigma, and developing anti-stigma strategies, 
which included the psychologically reparative work of protest itself (Taylor, 2016).  
 
Of central importance to these Black freedom struggles was Carmichael and Hamilton’s anti-
stigma concept of ‘Black Power’ which reconfigured racial stigma into ‘a revolutionary emotion’: 
‘We aim to define and encourage a new consciousness among black people’ they wrote, and 
facilitate ‘a sense of peoplehood: pride, rather than shame, in blackness’ (Carmichael & Hamilton, 
[1967] 1992, p. ix, p. viii).xix  In arguing that racial stigma functions as a form of psycho-social 
governmental power, Carmichael and Hamilton stressed the historic relationship between stigma 
and capitalism (racial capitalism), one which persists and continues to be resisted today. Indeed, 
as Jenna Loyd and Annie Bonds argue in this issue, Black Lives Matter marks another conjunctural 
moment in the history of racial capitalism in the United States – a period Michelle Alexander has 
coined ‘The New Jim Crow’ (Alexander, 2010). 
 
Despite the sophisticated understanding of racial stigma developed over a hundred years of Black 
sociological thought, the conceptualisation of stigma in sociology has largely been ‘structured by 
the absence of an address’ to this tradition (Bhambra, 2014a, p. 12). Recent scholarship suggests a 
renewed sociological interest in the relationship between racism, stigma and power (see Loury, 
2003; Howarth, 2006; Matory, 2015; Lamont et. al., 2016).  In seeking to historically resituate 
Goffman’s original account, this paper has drawn on a longer and wider range of interlocutors 
working in a Black sociological tradition, including Mario Biondi, James Boggs, Stokley Carmichael, 
Patricia Hill Collins, Angela Davis, Kimberley Dotson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Roderick Ferguson, Frantz 
Fanon, the Greensboro Four, Paul Gilroy, Lewis Gordon, Charles Hamilton, Harry Haywood, Robin 
Kelley, Joyce Lamont, Manning Marable, Zine Magubane, Anne Moody, Cedric Robinson, Hortense 
Spillers, Cornell West, Patricia Williams and Gary Younge. The account of stigma which emerges 
through this Black genealogy of stigma-thinking challenges the individualism of psychological 
approaches to social problems, exposes the limits of Goffman’s white normative perspective, and 
troubles “race neutral” forms of interactional analysis. What this scholarship offers in place of a 
Goffman-esque approach, are rich historical, political and economic conceptualisations of stigma 
as technologies of de-humanisation, and stigma as a form of power which has been collectively 
resisted from below. It is the argument of this paper that bringing racism and anti-racist 
scholarship to the front and centre of sociological understandings of stigma not only enriches its 
utility as an analytic for understanding racism but also other forms of “dehumanisation”—such as 
classist, disablist and misogynist practices -- which are also grounded in eugenicist and/or 
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i North Carolina A&T State University was then a segregated Black university, it was established on 
March 9, 1891 as “The Agricultural and Mechanical College for the Colored Race”. In 1969 a 
confrontation between the National Guard and student activists on this campus culminated in 
what Martha Biondi described as ‘the most massive armed assault ever made against and 
American university’, when the Army was drafted in to raid a male dormitory, which resulted in 
hundreds of students taken into police custody (Biondi, 2014, p. 158).   
 
ii  I am using Jibreel Khazan’s chosen name here, but in 1960 he was known by his birth name Ezell 
Blair. 
 
iii Sit-ins against anti-Black racism and segregation can be traced back to 1943 when Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE) activists occupied a Chicago restaurant that refused service to Black 
customers (see Meier & Rudwick, 1973; Andrews & Biggs, 2006).  
 
iv US television news footage of the sit-in movement from 1963, including some clips from 
Greensboro, can be viewed on the NBC online news archive here: 
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/today-in-history/22886961#22886961.  
 
v There are interesting parallels between this moment in US television history, and the importance 
of mobile media, such as smart phones, in documenting and distributing footage of police violence 
against Black citizens and #Blacklivesmatter protests in the US today.  
 
vii I have chosen to use Stokley Carmichael’s birth name, rather than Kwame Ture, to reflect the 
name he used during the period of activism and in the writings referenced in this article. 
 
 
ix The Free Speech Movement burst onto UC Berkeley campus in 1964, inspired first by the Civil 
Rights Movement, and later student-led opposition to the Vietnam War (see Freeman, 2004). 
 
x This student would have been in an extremely small minority at Berkley in 1961. It is estimated 
that there were only 100 Black students enrolled at the University in 1960, out of a student 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                                    
population of 20,000. Historical accounts of the University from this period describe the deep 
alienation experienced by Black students, both in terms of their minority status on campus, and in 
terms of the whiteness and the conservatism of academic curriculums (see Murch, 2010). 
 
xi As Heather Love notes, his ‘primary method of abstract synthesis is supplemented, perhaps even 
challenged, by the trace of the embodied, affective experience of social others, both fictional and 
real, archived in his footnotes’ (Love, 2010, p. 118).  
 
xiii See ‘Forum Introduction: Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Erving Goffman’s Stigma’ 
(2012) in Disability Studies Quarterly for reflections on Goffman and Hunt’s different 
contributions to thinking disability stigma. 
 
xiv See for example Judith Butler’s (1993) inspired work on the power of gender norms. 
 
 
xvii In 2017 Carolyn Bryant admitted that the testimony she gave in court, namely that Till had 




xix The transnational genealogical threads of Black epistemologies of stigma power are fascinating 
and important to note here. For example, it is in Frantz Fanon’s work that we find the most 
developed understanding of racial stigma as a penal technology – an explanation of how and why 
the modern history of anti-Black racism came to be written on the skin. Fanon was born in the 
French colony of Martinique, but later renounced his French citizenship. Fanon in turn inspired 
Stokley Carmichaels’ development of the concept of Black Power – while Fanon was himself 
indebted the writing of Du Bois, Richard Wright and James Baldwin.   
